La noción de persona como particular de base. La ontologí­a de la adscripción de Strawson, un precedente del soi-même de Ricoeur

Abstract

In this paper we begin in the point where Gilbert Ryle let the adscription of mental states, i.e., with some kind of apories that Ryle recognized more than ten years after the edition of The Concept of Mind. We examine the argument that leads Peter Strawson to his notion of person as a primitive complex notion. We show that this notion of person allow to resolve the problems caused by mentalism and behaviourism and anticipates Paul Ricoeur's ontology of soi-même, even if it does not attain the narrativist density which is the proper determination of the Self in Ricoeur, when he goes through the level of discret action to practices. We analyse also the links between the ontology of the person and some epistemological problems of action in social sciences.